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Almost seventeen years after the United States Supreme
Court decided Mapp v. Ohio,' the Louisiana Supreme Court
has for the first time directly addressed the issue of burden of
proof at motion to suppress hearings based upon alleged uncon-
stitutional searches or seizures. In State v. Franklin,2 the court
held "that once the defendant makes the initial showing at a
motion to suppress hearing that a warrantless search occurred,
the burden shifts to the State to affirmatively show that the
search is justified under one of the narrow exceptions to the
rule requiring a search warrant."'
Some of the prior confusion on the burden of proof issue
had resulted from article 703(C) of the Louisiana Code of Crim-
inal Procedure which provides that in a motion to suppress
"the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove the grounds
of his motion. . ... ' This provision must be read in light of
the constitutional burden of proof earlier alluded to in Chimel
v. California.I In Chimel the Court stated, "Clearly, the general
requirement that a search warrant be obtained is not lightly to
be dispensed with, and 'the burden is on those seeking [an]
exemption [from the requirement] to show the need for it
Franklin appears to recognize that the article 703(C) bur-
den is met when the defendant shows that no warrant was
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. 353 So. 2d 1315 (La. 1977).
3. Id. at 1318-19. This rationale should also apply to warrantless seizures without
searches.
4. See, e.g., State v. O'Conner, 320 So. 2d 188, 192 (La. 1975). See also State v.
Amphy, 259 La. 161, 249 So. 2d 560 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972).
5. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
6. Id. at 762, quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) (emphasis
added).
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obtained and that a seizure occurred. At that time the state
must "affirmatively show that the search is justified under one
of the narrow exceptions to the rule requiring a search war-
rant."7 This holding is of particular importance in light of the
often critical impact that factual findings based upon credibil-
ity evaluations play in warrant exception analysis.'
The court did not specifically hold that the state must
meet its burden of proof by "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt,"' by "clear and convincing evidence" or by "a prepon-
derance of the evidence." However, the court cited Lego v.
Twomey,", an involuntary confession case in which the United
States Supreme Court indicated that the state "must prove at
least by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession
was voluntary."" The court may well have applied this test in
Franklin in stating that "[i]f the evidence is in equipoise,
since the burden is on the State, then the motion to suppress
should have been granted ... ."" However, in prior Louisiana
warrant exception cases predicated upon consent, the court has
indicated that the state must meet its burden by "clear and
convincing evidence."' 3 Since the fundamental issue is the real-
istic enforcement of constitutional safeguards, whatever the
warrant exception at issue, it appears to this writer that the
more stringent standard of proof, clear and convincing evi-
dence, is appropriate."
Plain View
Several cases this term indicate the continued (but per-
7. 353 So. 2d at 1318-19.
8. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Pre-
trial Criminal Procedure, 36 LA. L. REv. 575, 590 (1976).
9. In confession cases the burden has been "beyond a reasonable doubt." See LA.
CODE CrIM. P. art. 703(C). See also LA. R.S. 15:451 (1950) in which the "affirmatively
show" language is similar to that of Franklin.
10. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
11. Id. at 489.
12. 353 So. 2d at 1321.
13. State v. Dupuy, 319 So. 2d 299 (La. 1975); State v. Amphy, 259 La. 161, 249
So. 2d 560 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972).
14. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975
Term-Pre-trial Criminal Procedure, 36 LA. L. REV. 575, 592 n.85 (1976).
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haps lesser) difficulty in dealing with the "plain view" concept.
In State v. Parker" the police, early one morning, observed a
lawfully parked van. With a flashlight an officer determined
that it was unoccupied and saw a "plastic bag protruding from
under the seat, which he thought contained marijuana."" One
officer opened the unlocked driver's door and removed the
package, and the defendant was arrested when he returned to
the vehicle.
The case presented two distinct issues regarding plain view
notions: first, whether the officers had the right to shine the
flashlight in the van to look (search) "to see if there was anyone
in it, or any type of letter or anything that might show a name
for possible identification,"" second, whether the officers had
the right to seize the marijuana.
The court's response to the search issue was:
[T]here can be no doubt that [the officer] did not in-
trude upon the defendant's protected area by standing in
the street along side the van. We pretermit deciding and
assume for the purpose of argument that the evidence was
inadvertently observed, and that it was clearly contra-
band. For the purposes of this decision, we may say that
the officers did not conduct an unconstitutional search. "8
The court considered whether the warrantless seizure was
unjustified, stating "there was no immediate danger that the
evidence would be spirited off or destroyed. Leaving the car
under surveillance while a warrant could be obtained would
have imposed no greater hardship on the officers, nor would it
have endangered the evidence.""
The holding in Parker appears to be predicated solely upon
the seizure issue, i.e., whether under the particular facts a
warrant should have been procured. The majority clearly rec-
ognized that probable cause alone, even in automobile cases,
is insufficient to authorize a warrantless seizure. The facts indi-
15. 355 So. 2d 900 (La. 1978).
16. Id. at 902.
17. Id. A license plate check was alleged to be unavailable.
18. Id. at 904 (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 906.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
cating exigency must be considered in each case.
Parker tells us little about what is a "search" within the
plain view concept. The nature of stating the assumption of
non-search, predicated on inadvertence, is perhaps signifi-
cant.2 0 This highlights the question of whether an officer can
intend to search and still fall within a plain view category.2
The search issue was presented two months later in State
v. Schmidt.22 After a high-speed automobile chase, the defen-
dant, a rear-seat passenger, was required to exit the car. An
officer then smelled an odor of marijuana smoke. Before enter-
ing the car he shined a flashlight inside, whereupon he saw a
"plastic bag, containing what appeared to be marijuana, par-
tially beneath a rear floor mat. '23
Justice Marcus, writing for the majority, acknowledged
that the burden of proof was on the state to show that the
search and seizure was justified under a warrant exception 24
and rejected the contention that the plain view exception ap-
plied to the search:
Under the facts of the instant case, we do not find
that the police officer had a legitimate reason to flash his
light into the automobile. The facts indicate that the com-
pact automobile had been stopped for traffic violations.
The car was located on the grounds of a state hospital and
was surrounded by a number of police officers. The driver
and two passengers had been removed from the vehicle.
Clearly, the subsequent flashlight check (intrusion) by
Deputy Braden into the vehicle (protected area) was not
done to determine if some person who might have harmed
him was concealed in the automobile. Rather, we find that
the flashlight check was done either as a prelude to or as
a part of the inventory search of the car. 23
It appears that the shining of the flashlight was an intru-
20. Id. at 904.
21. See, e.g., State v. Fearn, 345 So. 2d 468 (La. 1977).
22. 359 So. 2d 133 (La. 1978).
23. Id. at 135.
24. State v. Franklin, 353 So. 2d 1315 (La. 1978).
25. 359 So. 2d at 135-36 (emphasis added).
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sion or search because no factual need for such action was
shown. If the automobile had appeared abandoned or had been
used in an armed robbery, a reasonable factual need to shine
the light or search might well have been found.2" The funda-
mental question is whether there is an intrusion in an area in
which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. Justice
Marcus properly appeared unwilling to conclude that there was
always a reasonable expectation that police officers might
shine flashlights, and thus intrude, into (or search) stopped
automobiles. This privacy intrusion should be examined, as in
other cases, by weighing the governmental and personal inter-
ests involved in light of the particular facts of the case. Thus,
while there might well be no expectation of such an intrusion
in a routine driver's license check, there might well be if the
stopping is justified on a reasonable belief that dangerous crim-
inal activity is afoot.Y
In State v. Braud, 1 after a lawful traffic stop, an officer,
without the use of artificial illumination, observed loose mari-
juana on the driver's lap. A unanimous court held that such an
observation fell within the plain view doctrine. Apparently, the
critical difference from Schmidt is that in Braud there was no
significant enhancement of the opportunity for observation of
the contraband. Stated differently, the defendant simply had
no reasonable expectation that loose marijuana on his lap
would not be seen upon a lawful traffic stop. At night, a more
difficult constitutional question appears to arise.
In State v. Byers,2" the court again had to determine when
a search took place in light of plain view considerations. In so
doing, the court appears to have clarified the prior term's plu-
rality opinion in State v. Fearn.3 In Byers, after having been
notified by a hunter who had observed "a patch of plants under
cultivation, which he suspected was marijuana,"' 3' an officer
went onto the property where the plants were located without
26. See, e.g., State v. Jefferson, 284 So. 2d 882 (La. 1973).
27. For example, in State v. Williams, 349 So. 2d 286 (La. 1977) (armed robbery),
if the stop had occurred at night, the use of a flashlight might have been reasonable.
28. 357 So. 2d 545 (La. 1978).
29. 359 So. 2d 84 (La. 1978).
30. 345 So. 2d 468 (La. 1977).
31. 359 So. 2d at 85.
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a warrant or consent. Several months later the officer returned
with another officer, found the defendants at the cultivated
area and arrested them. The alleged marijuana patch was lo-
cated within a clearly posted 640-acre tract.2
Justice Sanders, who dissented in State v. Fearn, wrote for
the unanimous court. The court held that defendants had a
reasonable expectation of privacy because the property was
posted and a chain barred public access. Byers appears to be
predicated directly upon a conclusion that the marijuana patch
was not in "plain view" because the officers were not in a place
they had a right to be. The court stated:
[Plain view] does not apply if the view is from a
place that the officers have no right to be. In the present
case, the officers observed the marijuana from a position
on the property. The point of observation was a place that
the officers had no right to be without a search warrant."
The well-written opinion avoids confusion which often ar-
ises in "plain view" cases. It is clearly predicated upon the fact
that as the officers were not in a place they had a right to be,
they were violating the constitutional privacy expectations of
defendants. The observation (search), therefore, could not be
in "plain view."'"
The writer believes "plain view" cases can be better struc-
tured and more simply considered if the distinction between
the search and the seizure is kept clearly in mind. If an officer
observes something from a place where he has a right to be,
either because he has a warrant or because he is not invading
another's privacy interest, that which he observes is in "plain
view"; no illegal search or intrusion upon a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy has occurred. The "inadvertence" consideration
should arise only when an officer comes across evidence when
he is lawfully looking either because he has a warrant or be-
32. "PRIVATE ROAD; DO NOT ENTER; POSTED NO HUNTING, FISH-
ING, TRESPASSING; POSTED NO HUNTING." Id.
33. Id. at 87.
34. Therefore the court did not discuss the need for a warrant to seize (in addi-
tion to search) or the element of inadvertence. See, e.g., State v. Dunbar, 356 So. 2d
956 (La. 1978).
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cause the person lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy, i.e.,
reasonably expects that someone will not be looking. Upon
making any approved observation a seizure is not automatic,
the normal warrant exceptions to seizures must be considered
and applied.
Search Warrants-Inaccurate Affidavits
In light of the decision by a closely divided court on the
right to challenge search warrant affiant veracity,35 it is surpris-
ing that there was a unanimous decision by the court on the
res nova issue of how to treat misstatements in warrant affida-
vits. In State v. Rey,3 the court, speaking through Justice
Dixon, adopted the stringent test established by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States
v. Thomas.37 Under that test evidence must be suppressed if
the warrant was issued on the basis of an affidavit containing
a misstatement that was made with intent to deceive the mag-
istrate, whether or not the error was material to the showing of
probable cause, or was made unintentionally, but was material
to the establishment of probable cause. 38 In adopting this test
the supreme court rejected less stringent tests which would
hold a warrant valid if the affidavit contained a negligent,
unintentional misrepresentation that was material to probable
cause.
3 9
To implement the Rey-Thomas test the court must first
determine if there was intentional0 misrepresentation. If there
was, no matter what the probable cause significance, the war-
35. State v. Melson, 284 So. 2d 873 (La. 1973). Melson held that a defendant had
a right to traverse an affiant's allegations in an application for a warrant which were
alleged with particularity to be false. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Court
for the 1974-1975 Term-Pre-trial Criminal Procedure, 37 LA. L. REv. 535, 539 (1977).
36. 351 So. 2d 489 (La. 1977).
37. 489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 844 (1975). "We are in
agreement with the approach described by the Fifth Circuit and adopt it as our own."
351 So. 2d at 492.
38. See United States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d at 669.
39. United States v. Belculfine, 508 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1974); See United States
v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973).
40. " '[llntentionally' must be used here to mean [a] deliberate act made for
the purpose of deceiving the magistrate." State v. Rey, 351 So. 2d at 492 n.1.
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rant must be stricken. If there was only a negligent misrepre-
sentation, the information negligently given must be excised
and the court must determine whether there existed probable
cause absent the excised information. Rey thus embraces an
exclusionary policy which abhors both negligent material mis-
conduct and intentional misconduct whether it was material or
not.
The first successful application of the Rey test was in State
v. Martiniere." In that case the court found a deliberate misre-
presentation because the affiant "appeared" to have failed to
state affirmatively facts which reflected illegal searching activ-
ity and because the affidavit was "written in a manner which
intimates that all of the facts which it reveals were within the
firsthand knowledge of the affiant."'' It thus appears that the
court is willing to take a stringent attitude in examining affida-
vits which include misrepresentations and that the concept of
intentional misrepresentation will not be narrowly circum-
scribed. 3
Private Party Searches
In State v. Yates" the defendant was removed by a depart-
ment store security guard to a security office where, without
having been given Miranda warnings, he made an incriminat-
ing statement. The trial court refused to suppress the state-
ment on the basis that shoplifting detentions pursuant to arti-
cle 215 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not require the
41. 362 So. 2d 526 (La. 1978).
42. Id. at 529 (emphasis added).
43. The Rey-Thomas test may go beyond that required by the United States
Constitution. In Franks v, Delaware, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978), decided subsequent to Rey,
the United States Supreme Court stated: "There must be allegations of deliberate
falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth . . . ." 98 S. Ct. at 2685 (emphasis
added). The decision does not, however, hold that material negligent (simple negli-
gence) misrepresentation is acceptable as a basis for establishing probable cause.
Additionally, the court in Franks appeared unwilling to find an absence of probable
cause even when intentional misrepresentations were made if they were not material:
"[Ihf these requirements [specificity of allegations] are met, and if, when material
that is the subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there
remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable
cause, no hearing is required." 98 S. Ct. at 2685 (emphasis added).
44. 357 So. 2d 541 (La. 1978).
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warnings. The supreme court rejected this conclusion but
found that Miranda warnings were not required because the
defendant was not subject to a coercive environment and thus
was not "in custody," a requisite to trigger Miranda.4"
Two significant issues were not addressed by the court;
first, whether a "detention" as given in article 1, section 13, of
the Louisiana Constitution" means the same as Miranda's "in
custody," and second, whether action by a private party is
covered by the Miranda decision or the provisions of article 1,
section 13, under all circumstances, or whether it is brought
within this coverage because of the statutory authorization
given to stop suspected offenders under article 215."7 While it
appears that Miranda does not apply to private party searches
because of the fourteenth amendment limitation," it does not
necessarily follow that the analogous protections of article 1,
section 13, are inapplicable to private action, although the his-
tory of the provision indicates no such intent."
The fact that the court did not address the private party
issue is particularly interesting because earlier in the term the
court did address the issue, in a limited manner, in connection
with article 1, section 5, of the Louisiana Constitution. ° In
State v. Nelson5l the defendant allegedly was given two dia-
mond rings by a clerk but failed to return one. Two store guards
took the defendant to a room, handcuffed and unclothed him,
45. The uncontradicted testimony was that the defendant Was free to depart. 357
So. 2d at 543.
46. Article 1, section 13, of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution provides that when-
ever "any person has been arrested or detained in connection with the investigation
or commission of any offense," he shall be advised of several listed rights.
47. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 215 does not expressly authorize a search.
48. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
49. See Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of
1974, 35 LA. L. REv. 1, 40 n.207 (1974). See State v. Hutchinson, 349 So. 2d 1252 (La.
1978), for implicit application of article 1, section 5, to private action. See Hargrave,
supra, at 21.
50. Article 1, section 5, of the Louisiana Constitution provides in part:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of pri-
vacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the person or
things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search.
51. 354 So. 2d 540 (La. 1978).
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and then checked his clothing and person. After the defendant
had put his trousers back on, one guard thought he saw a gold
object "in the right rear of the gums.""2 When the defendant
refused to spit out the object, one guard grabbed his throat to
prevent swallowing. During the struggle an incriminating
statement was made. The ring was never recovered despite X-
rays and examinations of bowel movements.
The court stated the issue as "whether the statement was
the direct product either of an unlawful search or of the use of
unreasonable force.""8 Traditionally, involuntary statements
no matter by whom obtained are inadmissible because of the
high degree of unreliability.1' The court however preferred to
''rest [its] ruling . . . on the unreasonableness of the illegal
search by private persons, in the course of which the statement
was improperly obtained as a direct consequence of
unreasonable force exercised under the circumstances."55 The
court then concluded, "[T]he accused was subjected to [1]
an unreasonable search [2] under the color of authority
claimed by virtue of a statute [article 215 of the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure] that permitted private persons to use [3]
reasonable force to detain him.""
The court in Nelson did not hold that in all circumstances
private party searches are encompassed within the protections
against searches and seizures. The holding is limited because
of the statutory authorization and, perhaps most importantly,
the use of unreasonable force. Significantly, it is also limited
to seizures of inculpatory statements. It may be that the court
did not want to expand notions of voluntariness since there was
no clear intent to interrogate but rather simply to produce the
ring. A holding that the statement was involuntary would have
required the difficult determination of whether an interroga-
tion can be unintentional.
The holding appears to have extended protection against
52. Id. at 541.
53. Id.
54. See State v. Glover, 343 So. 2d 118 (La. 1977); State v. George, 15 La. Ann.
145 (1860).
55. 354 So. 2d at 542 (emphasis added).
56. Id. (emphasis added).
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a private party search and seizure through use of unreasonable
force resulting in an inculpatory statement. Whether statutory
authorization is of controlling significance is uncertain.57
Whether the same private party coverage would be applicable
if real evidence (such as the ring rather than the statement)
was produced is also uncertain in light of the traditionally more
stringent supervision of statements because of their inherently
lesser reliability when compared to real evidence.58
Inventory Searches of Vehicles
The Supreme Courts of the United States and Louisiana"
have held that "true inventory searches" of motor vehicles are
reasonable and thus not-in violation of the fourth amendment
of the United States Constitution or article 1, section 5, of the
Louisiana Constitution respectively. Several cases this term
help in determining what is a "true inventory search" and thus
a "reasonable" search pursuant to article 1, section 5, of the
Louisiana Constitution.
The cases appear to require as a necessary first element
that the vehicles be "lawfully and actually impounded."60 The
court has not yet found it necessary to articulate those circum-
stances in which a vehicle might be "lawfully impounded,"
because it has indicated that the mere lawful authority to im-
pound is insufficient to justify an inventory search; a vehicle
must be "necessarily" as well as "lawfully" impounded and the
search must be "necessary."'" While the language of the deci-
sions is devoted primarily to questions of good faith and subter-
57. See the discussion of State v. Yates, 357 So. 2d 541 (La. 1978), in the text at
note 44, supra.
58. See State v. Glover, 343 So. 2d 118 (La. 1977), and authorities cited therein.
59. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); State v. Jewell, 338 So. 2d
633 (La. 1976).
60. State v. Jewell, 338 So. 2d 633, 638 (La. 1976).
61. [I]n the crowded and mobile society of today, the practical exigencies
of law enforcement have sometimes been held to justify limited invasions of
privacy, restricted to their limited purpose, even though based on something less
than probable cause . . . . The so-called "inventory" search of motor vehicles
necessarily and lawfully impounded by the police, when the inventory is neces-
sary under the exigencies of the situation, is an instance.
State v. Gaut, 357 So. 2d 513, 516 (La. 1978) (emphasis by the court). See also State
v. Jewell, 338 So. 2d at 638.
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fuge, functionally the facts may be objectively analyzed in
terms of the necessity to impound and the necessity to search.
In State v. Rome"2 the court examined the necessity of the
impoundment when the officer, following an arrest for drunken
driving, did not ask the defendant "whether he could make
other arrangements for his vehicle (such as [leaving it] with
service station personnel or by calling a member of his fam-
ily)." 3 In State v. Gaut" that issue was examined when the
defendant, also arrested for driving while intoxicated,
requested that a passenger be allowed to take possession of the
vehicle. In both cases the court appears to have found no ne-
cessity to impound. 5
In Gaut Justice Tate indicated that, in some instances,
there may not be a necessity to impound a vehicle unless the
driver is given the additional option of consenting to the vehicle
being "left unsearched and parked."66 That there is a standard
police practice alleged to require the impoundment does not
appear to change the necessity to impound analysis. 7
The factors relating to necessity to search have received
the most attention by the courts. Because no case is predicated
wholly upon the necessity of impoundment, it cannot be said
that absent necessity to impound, the court has held the search
unconstitutional. The language and rationale of the cases, how-
ever, seem to provide that if there is no objective necessity to
impound, no inventory search should follow under any circum-
stances. If, however, there exists a necessity to impound (or
that fact is not controlling), facts relating to the necessity to
search should be examined.
Since the primary purpose of the search is to protect
against loss of valuables," it is necessary to search only when
62. 354 So. 2d 504 (La. 1978).
63. Id. at 505-06 (emphasis by the court).
64. 357 So. 2d 513 (La. 1978).
65. Because other facts relating to necessity to search were also present, it cannot
be said that either Rome or Gaut hold that absent a necessity to impound, a search
would be unconstitutional.
66. 357 So. 2d at 516 n.1.
67. See State v. Gaut, 357 So. 2d at 515; State v. Rome, 354 So. 2d at 506; State
v. Jewell, 338 So. 2d at 640.
68. State v. Jewell, 338 So. 2d 639 (La. 1976).
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there is a reasonable belief that valuables are present. If the
driver "disclaims that any valuables are involved and is willing
to consent to the agency's failure to afford him such protection
by an inventory search,"" the claim that an inventory search
is necessary is "hollow . . .indeed."70
The belief that valuables are present also relates to the
scope of the search. If the search extends beyond areas where
valuables can reasonably be expected to be, there appears to
be no necessity for an extended search.7' It may be that an
officer is obligated to ask whether there are valuables present
and then, if he obtains a negative answer, not to search for
them."
While many difficult questions are not finally re-
solved-such as whether the officer must ask whether any one
else could take possession of the vehicle, whether the driver
must request such action, whether the officer must ask whether
any valuables are present, and the extent to which an officer
can rely upon verbal statements that no valuables are pres-
ent-it does appear that the court's primary considerations are
the objective facts relating to the necessity to impound or
search.
Interestingly, however, most of the court's discussion in
the cases is devoted to the much more difficult factor of subjec-
tive good faith. It seems to this writer that a careful delineation
of the objective factors relating to the necessity to impound and
the necessity to search could alleviate much uncertainty by
eliminating in many cases the need to consider good faith at
all. If there is no objective necessity to impound or to search,
the inquiry should end. Superimposed on these objective fac-
tors should be the facts material to subjective good faith, which
should be considered only when an objective necessity to im-
pound and to search has been found.73
69. State v. Gaut, 357 So. 2d at 516.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., State v. Jewell, 338 So. 2d at 639, where the court stated that an
ashtray was an "unlikely place for anything of value which an owner could complain
was lost or stolen." See also State v. Rome, 354 So. 2d at 506.
72. See State v. Schmidt, 359 So. 2d 133, 136 (La. 1978).
73. Lack of good faith with respect to the need to search and the need to impound
has been found by the court to be reflected by (1) a search at the site rather than at
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In this quickly developing area of the law, it is commenda-
ble that the court is willing to look at all factors in individual
cases to determine whether the search was reasonable. The
writer believes it would be helpful if courts would delineate
when impoundment is objectively necessary and when a search
is objectively necessary; this would avoid in many circumstan-
ces the need to examine the more subjective good faith ele-
ment.
CONFESSIONS-JUVENILES
The difficult and sometimes ignored74 issue of whether the
waiver of Miranda rights in juvenile cases should be dealt with
differently than with adults was addressed in In re Dino.75 The
juvenile Miranda-waiver aspect of the Dino case, like Miranda
itself, does not appear to be as important for its holding, in
light of the specific facts, as it is for the regulatory and prophy-
lactic rules which it enunciates.
The court, speaking through Justice Dennis, rejected the
"morass of speculation""0 of the "totality of circumstances"77
test for constitutional waiver in juvenile cases and concluded:
[T]he rights which a juvenile may waive before in-
terrogation are so fundamental to our system of constitu-
tional rule and the expedient of requiring the advice of a
parent, counsel or adviser so relatively simple and well
established as a safeguard against a juvenile's improvi-
dent judicial acts that we should not pause to inquire in
individual cases whether the juvenile could, on his own,
understand and effectively exercise his rights.7 8
The court thus has adopted the protective rule that to
establish waiver the state must "affirmatively show that the
the place of storage, (2) failure to call a towtruck prior to beginning the search and (3)
failure to ask consent for the search. See State v. Gaut, 357 So. 2d at 516.
74. See, e.g., State v. Hills, 354 So. 2d 186 (La. 1978); State v. Hall, :350 So. 2d
141 (La. 1977).
75. 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978).
76. Id. at 591.
77. See, e.g., State v. Melanson, 259 So. 2d 609 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
78. 359 So. 2d at 592.
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juvenile engaged in a meaningful consultation with an attorney
or an informed parent, guardian, or other adult interested in
his welfare before he waived his right to counsel and privilege
against self-incrimination."
Several potential issues were not expressly considered. The
court did not discuss whether the concerned adult or attorney
must concur in the waiver, nor did it indicate whether
"meaningful consultation" requires concurrence. If the civil
incapacity analysis employed by the court is extended further,
it may be that concurrence is required since in the civil area
the adult must concur or be substituted for the minor in creat-
ing a judicially enforceable juridical act."0 However, it may be
that since significantly different societal values are involved,
the court will determine that concurrence, or its absence, is
only another circumstance in the new test for waiver. This test
may avoid some of the "morass of speculation" because the
presence of a concerned person will serve to facilitate a more
realistic and satisfactory determination of the juvenile's under-
standing and the voluntariness of his consent.
Also, the court did not discuss whether the protective rule
applies to a juvenile who is being prosecuted as an adult."' In
light of the policy considerations carefully articulated in Dino,
it appears that the rule would apply regardless of how the state
characterizes the charge. It is difficult to see how a sixteen-
year-old charged with murder as an adult can be presumed to
have a better understanding of his rights than one charged as
a juvenile with attempted murder. In State ex rel Coco,s2 the
court concluded that a juvenile is subject to juvenile jurisdic-
tion even if taken into custody for an offense for which he can
be prosecuted as an adult until formal charges have been
brought by indictment or information. While jurisdictional
concerns should not control considerations of constitutional
79. Id. at 594.
80. See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE art. 1785; LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 4501. See also LA.
CIv. CODE art. 2318. Even in a judicially supervised proceeding, if an incompetent is
not represented as required by law, the judgment is an absolute nullity. LA. CODE CIV.
P. art. 2002. Application of the civil incapacity analogy should require further study
in light of the different personal and governmental interests.
81. See LA. CONST. art. V, § 19.
82. 363 So. 2d 207 (La. 1978).
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waiver, the fact that the child is subject to juvenile jurisdiction
at the time most statements are obtained may fortify the posi-
tion that the protective rule given in Dino should apply here
also.
No doubt the drawing of the line at the age of seventeen
may create difficult cases for the court. For example, suppose
a "street-wise" sixteen-year-old and a more naive seventeen-
year-old are joint participants in criminal activity. If both con-
fess and the sixteen-year-old is not afforded the additional
Dino protections, his statement must be excluded; the
seventeen-year-old's statement is not. While initially this
might appear to be an untoward result, it should be remem-
bered that we are forced to draw lines in many areas of the law
that may cause similar results. s The nature of juvenile and
adult jurisdiction itself can create anomalous situations based
upon a few days difference in birth. The laudatory purpose of
Dino should not be quickly rejected because the prophylactic
rule may result in exclusion in cases that are similar but for the
age demarcation.
Finally, Dino raises the question of whether fourth amend-
ment waiver standards for juveniles are affected. Can, for ex-
ample, a fifteen-year-old consent to a search of his person or
property without consultation with an attorney or concerned
adult. Since informed consent of the Miranda variety itself has
never been required for fourth amendment waiver," it may be
that Dino-type safeguards are not required. The court should,
however, consider the nature of fourth amendment waiver in
juvenile cases in light of the policies articulated in Dino. One
significant difference between fourth and fifth amendment
considerations which might justify different treatment is the
difference in the reliability of the evidence produced."
83. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. V, § 19; LA. R.S. 14:80 (Supp. 1971), 14:81 (Supp.
1977), 14:92 (Supp. 1976); LA. CiV. CODE arts. 3528-55.
84. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); see, e.g., State v. Rogers,
324 So. 2d 403 (La. 1975).
85. See State v. Glover, 343 So. 2d 118 (La. 1977).
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